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The Concept of "Common Heritage
of Mankind": A Political, Moral
or Legal Innovation?*
STEPHEN GOROVE*
Recent technological advances and the ever-growing need for
new resources have centered both national and international at-
tention on the exploration and exploitation of the untapped re-
sources of what seems to have become man's last frontier-the sea.
It was Malta's representative, Ambassador Pardo, who in 1967
first suggested to the United Nations General Assembly examina-
tion of the question of "Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful
Purposes of the Sea-bed and of the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond the Limits of Present
National Jurisdiction and the Use of Their Resources in the Inter-
ests of Mankind."'  He proposed that the General Assembly de-
clare the seabed and the ocean floor and its resources as the
"common heritage of mankind" and take the necessary steps to
* This article is an elaboration of the author's presentation before the
Inter-American Bar Association's meeting on April 24, 1972 in Quito,
Ecuador.
** Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Mlississippi, School of Law. Author, LAW AND
Poiincs OF THE DANUBE: Aw INTEIscirmunAY STMUY (1964).
1. U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
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embody this basic principle in an internationally binding docu-
ment.2 Ever since that time, the quoted phrase has come up with
increasing frequency in various discussions in and out of the
United Nations. The purpose of this inquiry is to scrutinize this
concept and to determine its possible implications.
Ambassador Pardo's statement was not the first one to refer to
mankind in an international document. Among prior allusions
may be mentioned the United Nations' Charter, which refers to
wars as a "scourage of mankind,"3 the Antarctic Treaty, which
speaks of the "interests of science and mankind",4 and the Non-
proliferation Treaty, which refers to "the devastation that would
be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war."5 Also, in another
important area, the United Nations General Assembly recognized
early what it called the "common interest of mankind as a whole"
in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space.6
As a follow-up to Ambassador Pardo's statement the United
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 1968 to the effect
that exploitation of the resources of the seabed and ocean floor
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
should be carried out "for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
irrespective of the geographical location of states, taking into ac-
count the special interests and needs of the developing countries,"
and that the regime to be established should meet the interests of
"humanity as a whole."7
A year later, the General Assembly in another Resolution gave
recognition to the common interest of mankind in the reservation
of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes.8
Finally, in 1970 the General Assembly adopted a so-called "Dec-
laration of Principles" by a vote of 108 in favor to none against,
with 14 abstentions. 9 Intended as a basis of an international re-
2. Id.
3. Preamble to the United Nations Charter.
4. Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959 [1961] 12 U.S.T.
794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780.
5. Preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, June 12, 1968 [1970] 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839.
6. G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV) (1959).
7. G.A. Res. 2467 A (XXII) (1968).
8. G.A. Res. 2602F (XXIV) (1969).
9. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV); U.N. Doc. A/C.1/544 (1970).
gime for the seabed and its resources, the Declaration stated that
the area and its resources were the common heritage of mankind;
that the area should not be subject to appropriation by States or
persons, natural or juridical, and no State should claim sovereign
rights over any part thereof, or claim or exercise rights incom-
patible with the international regime to be established and the
principles of the Declaration; that all activities regarding the ex-
ploration and exploitation of the resources of the area and other
related activities should be governed by the international regime
to be established; that exploration of the area and exploitation of
its resources should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as
a whole and should be reserved exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses.10
While the quoted references have been only in the preamble of
an international treaty or in a General Assembly resolution, there
are recent examples of the phrase which have been used in the
operative part of such a treaty.
The Outer Space Treaty,'" for instance, stipulates that the ex-
ploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries, and shall be the "province of
all mankind."'12 In the same way, the Treaty declares that astro-
nauts shall be regarded by the parties as "envoys of mankind."1
The increasing references in international documents to man-
kind pose a number of questions regarding the meaning or spe-
cial connotation to be attached to this phrase. Does the frequent
allusion to it mean that a new or revolutionary legal concept has
been created or is it still more of a moral or biological concept
than one with newly emerging political and legal undertones?
Does the fact that the phrase appears in the operative part of an
international treaty make it clearly a legal concept? Furthermore,
what is the meaning and implication of the term in the particular
frame of reference associated with "common heritage?"
10. Id.
11. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (briefly referred to as Outer Space Treaty) was signed on January
27, 1967, and entered into force October 10, 1967. [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, reprinted in 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 644.
12. Outer Space Treaty, Art. I. For a discussion of the principle of
freedom of exploration and use with special reference to the benefit and
interests of all countries, see Gorove, Freedom of Exploration and Use in
the Outer Space Treaty: A Textual Analysis and Interpretation, 1 DrNvER
J. INT'L L. & POL. 93 (1971); Gorove, Limitations on the Principle of Free-
dom of Exploration and Use in the Outer Space Treaty: Benefit and In-
terests, PRoc. 13TH COLL. ON THE LAW OF OuTE SPACE 74 (1971).
13. Id., Art. V.
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CONCEPT OF MANKN
There have been innumerable instances of the use of the term
"mankind" in both the general and specialized literature. It
would be futile, if not impossible, to recall even in a schematic
fashion the biblical, philosophical, literary and other references to
this age-old phrase. The novelty that we encounter today lies
in the fact that this phrase is being used in international legal
documents giving rise to the implication that a new legal concept
is being created.
Meaning and Use
Before such conclusion may be safely drawn, it would appear
necessary to determine whether or not mankind, as a term, can be
under contemporary conditions meaningfully used as a legal con-
cept. The answer to this query would seem to depend on the pre-
cise meaning accorded to the term in the given context. The word
"mankind," in the common every-day usage, refers to all human
beings wherever they may be found and thus it includes both men
and women.
However, mankind as a concept should be distinguished from
that of man in general. The former refers to the collective body
of people, whereas the latter stands for the individuals making up
that body. Therefore, the rights of mankind should be distin-
guished, for instance, from the so-called human rights. Human
rights are rights which individuals are entitled to on the basis of
their belonging to the human race, whereas the rights of mankind
relate to the rights of the collective entity and would not be
analogous with the rights of individuals making up that entity.
Along the same lines, it has been suggested that the term "res
communis omnium" would imply for every individual, and not
just for every nation, the right to have an active part in and to
be co-proprietor in the enjoyment of the thing under consider-
ation.1.4 On the other hand, the phrase "res communis humani-
tatis" which bears close resemblance to the concept of "common
14. Scifoni, The Principle 'Res Communis Omnium" and the Peaceful Use
of Space and Celestial Bodies, PRoc. 12 COLL. ON LAW OF OuTER SPACE 50
at 51-52 (1970).
heritage of mankind" has been said better to express the idea
that the right is limited to states.15
Also, it has been suggested that all mankind does not participate
in the State itself, but that the State, in relation to international
agreements, is integrated into the juridical conception of man-
kind.10
Occasionally reference may also be found to this phrase even
in the sense that it encompasses all ages embracing not only
present but past and future generations as well. To some extent
it is this vagueness in the general meaning of the term that makes
acceptance of the phrase as a legal term particularly difficult.
Representation
Apart from the questions of meaning and use, there is also the
problem of representation. If the term mankind is a legal con-
cept, the question that must be answered is who represents it.
How could one state, or a group of states, or an international or-
ganization, be a spokesman or representative of all mankind,
without some formal act of authorization or mandate involving
such representation? How could the United Nations dispose of
property belonging to all mankind when it never received such
authority, either from members or nonmembers?
If the property of mankind belongs to all human beings, for a
disposition of such property, consent ought to be received in some
form (either through the mechanism of representation or directly)
from everyone. Strictly speaking, it could be argued that in order
to establish such authority voluntarily, every state's, if not every
person's, consent ought to be secured, if the authority is to act
legitimately and in a representative manner. No matter how
logically attractive such a solution may sound, it is highly unlikely
that, under present world conditions, such an authority could be
set up. For one thing, there might be some people living on
earth who, for some reason, would not be represented, or whose
consent could not be obtained. For another, some states might
not be parties to the treaty which would propose to establish an
international authority to act on behalf of mankind. Furthermore,
if mankind refers to the past and future generations as well, how
can the problem of representation be resolved with respect to
15. Id.
16. Cocca, Mankind as the New Legal Subject: A New Juridical Dimen-
sion Recognized by the United Nations, PRoc. 13TH CoLt. o i =H LAW Or
OUTER SPACE 211 (1971); cf. Maqueda, Something More About Humanity
as Subject of Law, Pioc. 13TH CoLL. oNr TH LAw or OUTER SPACE 215 (1971).
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them? Possibly, the answer may be that notwithstanding such
connotation, some organization could still be established with ap-
propriate authority to represent mankind.
Turning to Ambassador Pardo's proposal, it was suggested that
the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" implied formu-
lation of an international regime administered by a body repre-
sentative of the world community and that an international
agency assume jurisdiction of the seabed as a trustee for all
countries. 17
Among the considerations advanced in support of the creation
of international machinery were the following. The concept of
the "heritage of mankind" implied some kind of institutionalized
procedure to ensure that the resources of the area were exploited
for the benefit of all mankind, particularly in the interests of the
under-developed countries, including the land-locked countries.
The question of the international legal regime to govern the
area was closely linked to that of the international machinery to
be established for using the resources in the interests of mankind.
Some delegations considered that the establishment of interna-
tional control and jurisdiction was necessary and suggested that
this should be exercised through a competent agency under the
aegis of the United Nations.18
The U.N. Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area
advanced in 1971 by the United States proposed establishment of
such an agency in the form of an International Seabed Resource
Authority, an assembly composed of representatives of all con-
tracting parties, to represent the interests of "mankind" and for
that purpose, to determine budgets and the allocation of net
income from the internationalized seabed area, enter into contracts
and leasing agreements.' 9 Here again the problem of represent-
ation would continue to remain unless all States would become
parties to the treaty establishing such authority.
17. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed on the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Off. Rec.,
24th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/7622 at 97 (1969).
18. Id. at 89.
19. Arts. 31-35 of U.N. Draft Convention on the International Seabed
Area. For text of the Draft Convention, see 9 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1046
(1970).
At the present time it is uncertain what the fate of the U.N.
Draft Convention will be. However, already in the U.N. discus-
sions it was amply clear that the representatives of the Communist
bloc nations were opposed to the creation of an international
machinery since they felt any such machinery even if outwardly
democratic would be unworkable and would only widen further
the gap between the developed and developing nations.20
The foregoing discussions indicate some of the problems asso-
ciated with the establishment of an international agency which
would be representative of mankind as a whole and, at the same
time, they also raise doubts that at present the United Nations
with its limited membership and lack of clear-cut mandate could
legitimately act on behalf of mankind without encountering some
challenges both within and without the organization.
There is only one international agreement which gives some
indication that a kind of representation may have seemingly been
created for mankind. Article V of the Outer Space Treaty speaks
about astronauts as "envoys" of mankind.21 Unfortunately, how-
ever, this phrase has never been officially clarified, and it is not
known with certainty what the precise meaning of "envoy" should
be in the given context. While the term is reminiscent of a
similar expression used in connection with diplomatic represent-
ation,22 it is not very likely that the word was intended to carry
such connotation inasmuch as, at the present time, there are no
known outside worlds or intelligent beings to whom such envoys
could be sent as representatives of mankind. For this reason it
should not be assumed that the word "envoy", as used in the
Outer Space Treaty, would carry the same connotation as a diplo-
matic envoy with privileges and immunities. It seems more likely
that the term was used to convey the idea that other states should
not look upon an astronaut as an agent of a particular state, but
should regard him as a person whose aspirations transcend na-
tional interests, who therefore should be given prompt assistance
in case of distress or emergency landing, and who should be, in
such a case, returned promptly to the representatives of the
launching authority.
The conclusion that may be drawn from the preceeding dis-
cussion is that while the phrase "envoys of mankind", at initial
glance, seems to carry a representative connotation, in actuality
20. G.A., Off. Rec., supra note 17, at 89.
21. Outer Space Treaty, Art. V.
22. Gorove, International Protection of Astronauts and Space Objects,
20 DE PAuL L. REv. 597 at 598 (1970).
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there is no indication that this could, at the present time be the
case. However, inasmuch as the phrase is an evolving one, it is
possible that, with the passage of time, the term will crystallize
into a meaning involving representation. If man ever came into
contact with other intelligent beings, mankind could well be rep-
resented by its astronaut envoys and, in that case, the phrase
could convey a meaningful content.
If the problem of representation of human beings within the
concept of mankind is not resolved, it would be presumptious for
any particular organization to act or exercise rights on behalf of
mankind as a whole. This would not necessarily exclude the
possibility of having an organization which would be representa-
tive of the great majority of the world population constituting
mankind, encompassing all the great powers, as well as the over-
whelming majority of states. However, strictly speaking, even in
sueh a situation no claim should be advanced that the organiza-
tion is acting on behalf of all mankind. Otherwise strong doubts
could be expressed regarding the authority or legitimacy of such
a body to dispose of property rights and interests which have been
vested in all mankind.
If the political unity of mankind is lacking could we talk about
a moral, ethical or philosophical unity? Could a religious body
represent mankind? In answer to these questions, it would seem
that there is no more moral, ethical or philosophical unity of
mankind at the present time than there is political unity. Also,
it would appear that no single religious body would be likely to
be able to represent mankind. Even if it did, this would be a
representation in religious and not political or legal matters.
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a group could take advantage
or dispose of rights or interests belonging to all mankind.
The foregoing discussion seems to indicate that at the present
time mankind, as a full-fledged legal entity, does not, as yet, exist
simply because of the lack of an authority properly endowed with
powers to act on its behalf. This conclusion would, in a sense,
imply that until the time that such authority is established which
would be representative of all mankind, it would be usurpation of
power to dispose of property or other interests belonging to man-
kind. The converse, it would seem, is not necessarily true. Ac-
cording to all appearances, mankind has already been designated
as a kind of a general beneficiary in some international treaties.
As intimated before, Article I of the Outer Space Treaty makes,
for instance, the exploration and use of outer space the province
of all mankind.23 Of course, because of the lack of any clear-cut
mandate of representation, it is hard to see how mankind could
meaningfully exercise or defend its rights and interests. Possibly,
the states parties to the treaty could point to its violation by an-
other party, if that be the case. However, at the present time, it is
somewhat hard to visualize how such an attempt would succeed
because of the general vagueness of the word province, as well as
the uncertainty still surrounding the concept of "mankind."
COmmON HERITAGE
The remaining part of our subject matter must be devoted to
a brief analysis of the meaning of common heritage as used in
the phrase "common heritage of mankind."
Meaning in General
The word "common" usually refers to a thing which belongs to
everyone, or which is shared jointly by all. Webster's dictionary
defines the word "common" in one sense as "belonging to the
community at large; public. ' 24  If these definitions are used
strictly, it would mean that all human beings who constitute
mankind could share in whatever belongs to mankind. If this be
the case, one may wonder how any property belonging to mankind
could be disposed of without the agreement of everyone else. It
would seem that a general representation of the individuals by
their state on the political level would not necessarily have to be
regarded as endowing the state with authority to dispose of prop-
erty belonging to all individuals within that state without their
specific consent.
The word "heritage" brings up many additional questions. In
the every day use of the term refers to some property or property
interests which belongs to a person or is reserved to him by
reason of his birth. Webster's dictionary defines heritage as "prop
erty that is or can be inherited. ' 25 It also refers to it as "some-
thing handed down from one's ancestors or the past, as a charac-
teristic, a culture, tradition, etc."'2 6 If something, such as the deep
23. See textual discussion, note 12.
24. WEBsTER's NEW WoRw DICTIONARY OF THE AImESIcAN LANGUAGE 295
(1956).
25. Id. at 679.
26. Id.
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seabed, is regarded as the common heritage of mankind, and if
heritage involves some property handed down from ancestors,
the question arises, who are to be regarded as mankind's an-
cestors? It could not very well be said that many kinds of
ancestors are the forefathers who constituted mankind in the
past if mankind does include not only present but past generations,
as well. Even if the people who constitute mankind on a particu-
lar day, year, age or hour were regarded as different and inde-
pendent from the people constituting mankind at a different hour,
day, year or age, it would be difficult to see from whom the
original property was derived.
Who or what entity acquired the seabed originally and handed
it down to people personally constituting mankind? Furthermore,
can a property or a right-in-property be in existence in relation
to a thing which has never been subject and, in fact, can not be
subject under the then existing technology to human domination
and control? It would appear that this creates a serious question
as to whether property rights in relation to such an object can
be created at all. Could someone, for instance, stipulate today
that the stars of a far away galaxy constitute the common heritage
of mankind? Would such a provision, if inserted in an interna-
tional treaty, carry any meaning at a time when technologically
the human exploitation of such stars is not feasible? Also, it
would be somewhat of a contradiction and logical inconsistency
to say such stars would constitute common heritage if they have
not been acquired by some person or entity beforehand who could
have handed it down to later generations. In other words, in
order to have something handed down by way of heritage, the
ancestors must have had property rights or interests in the ob-
ject. Any other construction of such term would carry only
philosophical, moral or other implications void of any legal con-
notation.
U.N. Discussions
Turning to an analysis of the concept in the light of discussions
at the United Nations, it may be stated that the idea that the
seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction are the "common heritage" of mankind
was widely supported but not acceptable to all. A number of
representatives felt that the concept of common heritage was
neither realistic nor practical and that the activities of States in
the area should be in conformity with international law and the
Charter.27  While no one wished to be explicit-as Professor
Henkin observed 2 8-as to what common heritage meant, a some-
what random sample indicates broad variations among the views
of various delegates.
The Chilean delegate referred to the new and revolutionary
concept of common heritage as "an indivisible property with fruits
that can be divided" among all states participating in the admin-
istration of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.29
The Yugoslav delegate on his part saw three vital ingredients in
the concept of common heritage: "common wealth, common man-
agement, and common and just share of benefits.130
Voicing the general opinion of the Soviet bloc, the Ukranian
SSR representative stated that in view of the existence of states
"with different economic and social systems" and "different forms
of ownership" it was "completely unrealistic" to "attempt to ad-
minister a common ownership of the seabed."31
The Belgian representative stated that his delegation never
recognized the concept of common heritage as having any clear
juridical significance. Nonetheless, he believed it represented a
moral and political complex of great value. His delegation could
equally well have accepted the terms of "common property,"
"common wealth," "international public domain" and so on, all
of which expressed the same fundamental idea.3 2
Occasionally there has also been reference to common patri-
mony as a substitute phrase for common heritage. However,
comments of certain delegates indicated that common patrimony
might be equivalent to a gold rush by all interested nations; it
has been observed that this is a national rather than a "common"
heritage.33
The exercise of exclusive rights by an international agency was
in accordance with some versions of the "common heritage" ap.
proach to seabed resources, whereby these resources were to be
27. G.A., Off. Rec., supra note 17, at 98.
28. Henkin, The General Assembly and the Sea, PRocEEmNS 5H Ax-
TUAL CONFERENCE LAW OF =rn SEA INsTITUTE 2 at 24 (1971).
29. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1755, at 12 (1970).
30. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1784, at 28 (1970).
31. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1602, at 53 (1970).
32. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1788, at 24 (1970).
33. Brooks, The Malta Plan and the United Nations, 16 (miimeo, 1969).
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regarded as trustproperty, to be held and developed in the general
interest. However, it was also contended that the concept was in
fact compatible with various forms of machinery and was not
necessarily to be identified with the exercise of sole rights by an
international body. If exclusive rights were to be awarded, there
would be different ways in which they might be exercised: the
agency itself might conduct direct exploration and exploitation
operations, with its own staff and facilities; it might arrange for
others to perform these operations on its behalf by a system of
service contracts or by issuing licenses; or joint ventures could be
undertaken with other bodies such as, for instance, government
enterprises or international consortia.34
Additional differences of opinion existed among the delegates
regarding the question whether both the area as well as the re-
sources of the seabed should be regarded as the common heritage
of mankind. The Declaration's clear reference to both the area
and its resources 5 prompted the Canadian delegate to express his
concern since the statement that the area itself was the common
heritage of mankind implied in a sense that all uses of the seabed
not just those involving the exploration and exploitation of its
resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction would be
regulated by the international regime to be established. He coun-
seled caution against attempting to regulate all other uses and
activities in view of the complex and far-reaching problems in-
volved. 36
The representative of Ecuador said that the developing countries
could not accept a limitation of national jurisdiction before a
regime was established for the international area. Argentina,
Cameroon, Chile, El Salvador, India, Iran, Jamaica, Peru, the
Philippines, the Sudan and Trinidad expressed similar views.37
SoiM CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The conclusion that may be drawn from the preceding array
34. G.A., Off. Rec., supra note 17, at 113.
35. G.A., Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970).
36. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1779, at 4-5 (1970). Under Article 1 of the
U.N. Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area proposed by the
United States, the seabed area would be the common heritage of mankind,
and no state could exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over this area
or its resources. See IN'!L LEGAL MATERiALs, supra note 19, at 1048.
37. 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRoN. (No. 1) 40 (1971).
of considerations is that the reference to the rather elusive and
undefined concept of "common heritage of mankind", no matter
how well motivated, in a legally binding document would be un-
fortunate unless it is realized from the outset that it carries no
clear juridical connotation but belongs to the realm of politics,
philosophy or morality, and not law. This is not to say that
philosophers, politicians or moralists would necessarily be in a
better position to give a rational explanation of the meaning of
the phrase.
In light of the arguments advanced, the question may be raised
whether the inclusion of the phrase "heritage of mankind" in a
United Nations General Assembly Resolution has not, in fact,
been somewhat premature if it was supposed to carry some legal
implications.
On the other hand, it may be observed that the development
and growth of the law is, in many cases, a slow process. Terms
and phrases which carry only very vague or general connotations
may, with the passage of time, ripen into legal concepts and
principles. Undoubtedly, the concept of "common heritage of
mankind" will need clarification with particular emphasis on its
juridical ramifications. Otherwise, how can we expect the inter-
national community to honor the requirements pertaining to
mankind which have been incorporated in significant international
agreements or to live up to the spirit of U.N. resolutions if there
is no clear understanding of at least the basic legal implications?8"
The conclusion that the concept of "common heritage of man-
kind" to be applied to a proposed regime for the seabed and ocean
floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is not at the present
time a legal principle but only a reflection of political aspirations
and, at best, moral commitments, does not imply any value
judgment de Zege ferenda. In fact, perhaps the time has come
for the law to move in the direction of recognizing mankind's
interests, its rights and obligations, as distinct from those of the
nation state and provide for a fully representative international
body with appropriate authority to act in its behalf. It is in this
sense that-no matter how premature or unrealistic the inclusion
of the phrase in a General Assembly resolution may have been-
the United Nations may have taken a landmark decision by de-
claring the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction to be the common heritage of mankind. As
38. See my remarks before the Law of the Sea Institute in PnocmDmiGS
6T AtuoAL CoNr. LAW or m SEA INSTIsuTE 85 (1972).
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the then Secretary General U Thant put it: "The seas and the
oceans-covering more than 70 per cent of the earth's surface
and providing two thirds of the oxygen we breath and the totality
of our life-giving waters-henceforth would be a reminder of the
physical and biological interdependence of the planet and of the
choices before mankind: to swim or to sink together, to destroy
or to preserve this common heritage."39
39. 8 U.N. MoNmHy Cnxox. 22-23 (April, 1971).
